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Abstract
Traynom, Maegan Kay. M.A. The University of Mmephis. December 2011.
Protecting Human Rights: An Examination of Judicial Independence and Treaty
Compliance. Major Professor: Robert Blanton, PhD.
States agree to many human rights protections through treaty ratification. Often,
however, states do not comply with the treaties they have ratified and human rights are
abused. This study focuses on the role of the judiciary in holding the state accountable to
their obligations under human rights treaties. Specifically, examining whether having an
independent judiciary positively correlates with being compliant with human rights
treaties. This is done through an exploratory case study of Brazil, which examines both
its general court system and its military court system. While the general court system is
very independent, the military court system is not. This clearly affects human rights
practices in the area of physical integrity rights, leaving Brazil noncompliant with many
human rights treaties.
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Chapter 1 – Problem and Purpose
“Recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the
world” (United Nations, 1948). In 1948 the General Assembly of the United Nations
drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. With this document the United
Nations hoped to give states clear definitions of human rights to help them better protect
the rights of their citizens. Since then, human rights have been reaffirmed and expanded
with the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR,
1966) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966).
Together these three documents comprise the International Bill of Human Rights, which
established the legal framework for human rights protections. Furthermore, there are nine
core human rights treaties, and each treaty has an established committee of experts
trained in monitoring the implementation of the treaties in their member states (United
Nations, 2007). In addition to the legal foundations of human rights protections,
involvement has expanded to include non-governmental organizations and international
governmental organizations. For example, the Responsibility to Protect coalition consists
of various non-governmental organization that strive to bring awareness to human rights
violations and build up state capacities to prevent such violations from occurring
(Responsibility to Protect). Together, these forces have facilitated the acceptance of
human rights protections as an international norm, one which should be respected by all
states.
However, even with the various legal documents, committees, and involvement
from various groups that aim to enforce the protection of human rights, noncompliance
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with human rights treaties still occurs, leading to human rights abuses. These human
rights abuses are systematic and recurring, ranging from violations of civil and political
rights, such as restrictions on domestic movement to violations of physical integrity
rights, such as extrajudicial killings. These abuses are not centralized to a particular state
or region, but rather occur in every state, albeit not equally severely. Ideally, human
rights would be universally respected and protected by state governments. This would
allow for the protection of the “inherent dignity and inalienable rights of all members of
the human family,” as stated by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. However,
that simply is not the case currently, and unless positive changes are made in state
compliance of human rights treaties, this outcome should not be expected. How can
compliance with human rights treaties and the protection of human rights be encouraged
and ensured?
A good bit of literature focuses on the issue of compliance and specifically
whether states comply with international law in general (Chayes & Chayes, 1993;
Hafner-Burton, 2008; Meyer, 1999; Simmons, 2009), as well as human rights treaties
specifically. I suggest that a key variable for enforcing compliance with human rights
treaties is the presence of an independent judiciary. The judiciary is a unique institution
that is designed to reign in the power of the executive and legislative branches by
providing horizontal and vertical accountability. Furthermore, the judiciary is charged
with the responsibility to maintain the rule of law in a state. The judiciary is therefore
capable of holding other branches of government accountable in general, and specifically
to their obligations under human rights treaties.
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To illustrate the relationship between judicial independence and compliance with
human rights treaties, I use the case of Brazil, which is unique in that it has two separate
judicial institutions. One of the judicial institutions is the general court system used for
the majority of citizens. This institution was developed after Brazil democratized in the
1980s and has been established independently from the executive and legislative branch.
The second judicial institution, the military court, is a vestige of the autocratic regime
that existed in Brazil pre-democratization. This court is responsible for hearing all cases
involving police officers. Incidentally, Brazil experiences a vast majority of its human
rights abuses in the area of physical integrity rights, such as torture, political
imprisonment and extrajudicial killings. These abuses mainly occur during police
encounters. An examination of how the military courts do not function independently will
explain this phenomenon.
Towards examining this issue, the next chapter will discuss human rights and the
universality of human rights. In order to assume that states have an obligation to protect
the human rights of their citizens, it must first be established that human rights do exist,
and that each state has a universal responsibility to protect them. This chapter will
consider various aspects of human rights, including cultural, normative and legal. Chapter
3 will look at state compliance with human rights treaties. Specifically, I will consider the
reasons why some states comply with their international treaty obligations and other
states fail to do so. This chapter will discuss the system level of analysis used for
studying treaty noncompliance, as well as the state level of analysis. Chapter 4 will look
at the existing literature on human rights practice and treaty compliance as studied using
a regime level of analysis. Specifically it will consider the relationship between human
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rights and liberalism, as well as human rights and democracy. Chapter 5 begins the
discussion on judicial independence. The mechanisms of an independence judiciary will
be analyzed and existing literature on the relationship between judiciaries and human
rights will be discussed. Specifically this chapter will focus on the structure of the
judiciary. Chapter 6 will begin my analysis of human rights data and the relationship
between human rights treaty compliance and judicial independence. This chapter will
include a case study of Brazil, specifically focusing on the structure of their judiciary and
how these attributes relate to compliance with human rights treaties. My findings will be
discussed and ultimately conclusions will be made regarding the viability and accuracy of
my proposed theory.
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Chapter 2 – Human Rights and Universality of Human Rights
What are Human Rights?
Introduction
In the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), the UN states that “All
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights” (United Nations). According
to this statement, every person is entitled to the protection of human rights based on the
qualification of being human. The UDHR includes both negative and positive rights.
Negative rights are prohibitions, and are written in a way that protects citizens from
specific actions of the government. Positive rights are written in a way that requires the
government to actively protect specific rights. Negative rights include protections from
slavery, torture, arbitrary arrest, being deprived of a nationality and arbitrary deprivation
of property. Positive rights include the rights to life, liberty, property, recognition as a
person before the law, equal protection of the law, fair and public hearings, marriage,
property ownership, opinion and expression, assembly and association, education,
adequate healthcare, to freely move within their country, and to leave and return to a
country. These rights have not only been outlined by the UDHR but have also been
reinforced by various human rights treaties.
There are three main categories of human rights: civil-political, socio-economic
and collective-developmental. Civil-political and socio-economic rights represent rights
of the individual against the state, whereas collective-developmental represent rights of
peoples and groups against the state (Twiss, 1998, p. 272). Each group then contains two
sub-categories. Civil-political rights include rights pertaining to physical and civil
security (for example: protections against torture, extrajudicial killings, arbitrary arrest
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and equality before the law) and civil-political rights (for example: freedom of speech,
expression, assembly, and political participation). Socio-economic rights include
provisions of goods meeting social needs (for example: access to nutrition, shelter, health
care and education) and provisions of goods meeting economic needs (for example: fair
wages and adequate living standard). Collective-developmental rights also includes two
sub-types: rights pertaining to the self-determination of peoples (for example: rights to
political status, and rights to economic, social and cultural development) and rights
protecting religious and ethnic minorities (for example: the right to enjoy a groups own
cultures, languages and religions) (Twiss, 1998, p. 272). These three basic types of
human rights are largely recognized by the international community.
This chapter will examine the various controversies surrounding human rights
protections. First, I will discuss the distinction between group rights and individual rights,
and how each category has influenced the development of human rights in general. I will
also consider the various positions on universality of human rights, ultimately discussing
a legal defense of the universality of human rights, which will be used to defend universal
human rights henceforth.
Group Rights
Collective-development rights are more recently becoming an important topic in
human rights discourse. When the UDHR was drafted, the goals were to clearly outline
individual human rights. Individual rights had not yet been clearly defined in
international law. This effort was actually in response to a previous effort to protect
group rights, which was prevalent after World War 1. The shift in discourse from group
rights to individual rights was a response to negative effects of the focus on group rights.

6

The focus on group rights actually led to more hostility towards minority groups. This
occurred because the definition of group rights allowed majority groups to further
marginalize minority groups because the minority groups were well defined and
ostracized. This creation of the minority identity strengthened the identity of the majority
ethnic groups, creating a very clear “other”. One commentator stated “The lesson of
WWII was that emphasizing minorities and highlighting their differences through special
protections encouraged groups to define themselves in opposition to others,” and “Nazi
racial doctrines appeared to be the inevitable result of such a course” (Oestreich, 1999, p.
113). Because of this, the drafters of the UDHR made an effort to focus on individual
rights, assuming that group rights would consequently be protected if individual rights
were maintained.
While individual rights have been the main focus of human rights discourse since
the drafting of the UDHR in 1948, recently there has been a new push to protect group
rights in conjunction with individual rights. It is suggested that this change in human
rights discourse is due to globalization (Twiss, 2004). Globalization has recently lead to
more focus being placed on collective-development rights because many indigenous and
minority groups have become further disadvantaged due to the effects of globalization.
The collaboration (whether intentional or not) of state actors and agents of capital
formation (e.g., International Monetary Fund, World Bank, transnational
corporations)- have instituted policies and procedures which have so accelerated
the destruction of these peoples, their environments, their economies, and their
cultures that they have been brought to the brink of annihilation. (Twiss, 2004, p.
44)

Indigenous groups, such as the Bayaka, Dinka, Wichi, Miskito, and Kuna (International
Forum on Globalization) are falling victim to the process of globalization and
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development. While larger corporations are able to succeed in the expanding global
market, local indigenous groups are being stripped of their resources, land and rights in
the name of global economic improvements and development. Because of this, more
focus has been recently placed on the rights of these groups, which may be unique from
individual human rights.
While I do believe there is value in studying collective rights, as of this time these
rights are not universally accepted in the international community. In fact, the issue has
been surrounded with much contention. The argument still stands that as long as
individual rights are protected, group rights will be protected as well. Therefore, when
examining compliance with human rights treaties, I will not be examining compliance
with the Declaration on The Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Rather, the content “human
rights” referred to in this thesis will include only individual rights.
Universality of Human Rights
Culture
Human rights should be guaranteed to all human beings, on the basis that each
person is a member of the human race. The various treaties drafted by the United Nations
and ratified by various states rest on the assumption that human rights apply to everyone,
based on the qualification of being human. If such universality exists, an implied duty on
the state to protect these rights also exists. This would mean that every state has an
obligation to protect the human rights of its citizens. However, some theorists argue
against a universality of human rights, citing cultural aversions to many of the rights
listed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). If adhering to this
argument, then it must be conceded that not every state has the duty to protect human

8

rights. Rather, states with cultural aversions to human rights have a legitimate excuse not
to protect the human rights that go against the culture or religion of the state. Alison
Renteln (1988a,b) and Anthony Pagden (2003) argue that the development of human
rights has stemmed from mainly western theorists. Because of this, problems arise when
a document, which was formulated from one culture’s view on human rights, is applied
universally. Views of the American Anthropological Association during the drafting of
the UDHR reflect arguments made by Renteln (1988a, b) and Pagden (2003). The
association released the “Statement on Human Rights” in 1947, in which they stated,
It will not be convincing to the Indonesian, the African, the Indian, the Chinese, if
it lies on the same plane as like documents of an earlier period. The rights of Man
in the Twentieth Century cannot be circumscribed by the standards of any single
culture, or be dictated by the aspirations of any single people. Such a document
will lead to frustration, not realization of the personalities of vast numbers of
human beings. (American Anthropological Association, 1947, p. 543)
The American Anthropological Association argued that the UDHR would actually do the
opposite of which it was intended. Rather than protecting human rights, it would cause
frustration in the international community due to conflicting cultures.
Since the focus of human rights is basic human dignity and human needs,
problems arise when presuming all human beings view dignity in the same light and have
similar needs. Because of this it could be argued that universally enforcing states to
comply with the same human rights takes on a form of cultural imperialism. If human
rights truly are derived solely from Western theory, then to incorporate Western theory
into international law to be applied universally would be very imperialistic. Universal
rights cannot be fairly created and applied because the creation of rights historically has
ignored cultural implications of specific rights. “The premise that individuals could
negotiate for fundamental principles in the absence of culture is quite fantastic” (Renteln,
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1988b, p.349). This argument deconstructs the presumption that human rights are
universal, although it is not an opposition to human rights. Human rights, in general have
been accepted as a universal norm and no state would blatantly argue that they do not
agree with human rights (Messer, 1993, p. 223). Rather, human rights, constructed
largely by western theorists, cannot exist as one unit, applicable to all human beings.
Thus, states with differing cultures and religions continue to disagree on which rights
should be applied universally, and who is actually protected under them. Along these
lines, the idea that one document, derived from one culture, is able to regulate human
rights practices internationally is not only absurd and impractical, but also imperialistic.
Women’s rights are an example of disputed rights. While the rights of women are widely
protected and encouraged, many states still maintain religious oppositions to women’s
rights. Specifically, these oppositions could come from states that use Sharia law,
including many Middle Eastern and Northern African states.
Normative Standpoint
Others take a normative standpoint, arguing that human rights should be protected
simply because it’s the right thing to do. This is seen in work by John Rawls who
advocated the law of peoples. The law of peoples is a “political conception of right and
justice that applies to the principles and norms of international law and practice” (Rawls,
1997, p. 36). The law of peoples is different from international law, as it is not a positive,
legal contract. Rather, the law of peoples is derived from “political concepts of right,
justice and the common good” (Rawls, 1997, p. 43). These concepts are then used to
form international law. The law of peoples is derived from moral grounds, as opposed to
legal grounds, and specifically has roots in natural law. The law of peoples is a concept of
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right and justice, and should be applied to all international law to protect justice for all
people in the international community. Justice should be accessible to everyone merely
on the qualification of being human. The protection of human rights serves this purpose.
While natural law is typically seen as a liberal theory, and certainly the argument
could be made that the law of peoples is derived from liberalism, Rawls states that a
society does not have to be liberal in order to respect the law of peoples. In fact, a basic
tenet of liberalism is tolerance of “other persons’ comprehensive religious, philosophical,
and moral doctrines” (Rawls, 1997, p. 37). This, however, is not a carte blanche for
tyrannical and dictatorial regimes. Rawls continues to say that other societies must be
respected, provided their doctrines are “pursued in accordance with a reasonable political
conception of justice” (p. 37). Thus, while other, perhaps non-liberal, doctrines should be
respected, they still must adhere to a reasonable concept of justice. In the international
community, human rights have been seen as something that ought to be protected.
Therefore, states that adhere to a reasonable concept of justice will protect human rights.
The protection of human rights is not necessarily inherently liberal, but rather is a part of
a reasonable law of peoples (Avila, 2007; Rawls, 1997). Thus, states that do not respect
human rights fail to recognize a normative concept of justice that is agreed upon in the
international community. The claim that the human rights should be respected universally
because it is derived from a universal moral norm would raise arguments from scholars
who refuse to claim that any norm could be applied universally (American
Anthropological Association, 1947; Gilligan, 1982; Messer, 1993; Renteln, 1988a, b).
While the arguments against the universality of human rights and the supporting
argument for the universality of human rights based on norms are compelling, there are
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problems with both that prevent either from being the most practical way to study and
apply human rights. The argument against the universality of human rights leads to the
conclusion that nothing can or should be done to enforce human rights protections
universally. Yet concluding this, no progress can be made towards ensuring that all
persons experience the human rights protections that they are indeed entitled to as a
member of the human race. By simply stating they do not agree with the terms set forth
by international law makers, due to cultural aversion or religion, state governments can
effectively excuse themselves from any duties to protect human rights. However, the
normative view of human rights leads much to be desired in terms of guaranteeing that all
states commit to protect human rights. Most people would likely agree that human rights
should be protected and that the protection of human rights leads to justice. However,
simply stating that human rights are universal because all humans deserve access to
certain rights does not provide any mechanism of accountability. Furthermore, it seems
likely that this justification for the universality of human rights would be difficult to find
complete agreement on. Scholars such as Pagden (2003) and Renteln (1988) would argue
that norms can never be agreed upon. Because of this, a legal view of human rights serves
the best purpose in terms of defining their universality and also in charging states with
the duty to protect human rights.
Legal Standpoint
International human rights have been largely advanced by the various human
rights treaties drafted by the United Nations (UN). Without the legal documents that have
advanced the protection of human rights, they would not have the legitimacy that they do
today. According to the UN,
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While international treaties and customary law form the backbone of international
human rights law other instruments, such as declarations, guidelines and
principles adopted at the international level contribute to its understanding,
implementation and development. Respect for human rights requires the
establishment of the rule of law at the national and international levels. (United
Nations, 2011, International Human Rights Law)
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights was a legal document produced by the UN,
to which a most states are parties. Furthermore, there are nine human rights treaty-based
bodies that monitor the implementation of human rights. Each of these treaty-based
bodies is specifically designed to monitor the rights outlined in a specific human rights
treaty. Additionally, 19 other UN agencies are involved in protecting human rights, and
work closely with the nine core treaty-based bodies to do so (United Nations, 2011,
“Other”). Furthermore, at least some concept of human rights has been written into most
state constitutions (Henkin, 1989, p.13; United Nations, 1948). According to the United
Nations:
The core principles of human rights first set out in the UDHR, such as
universality, interdependence and indivisibility, equality and non-discrimination,
and that human rights simultaneously entail both rights and obligations from duty
bearers and rights owners, have been reiterated in numerous international human
rights conventions, declarations, and resolutions. Today, all United Nations
member States have ratified at least one of the nine core international human
rights treaties, and 80 percent have ratified four or more, giving concrete
expression to the universality of the UDHR and international human rights.
(United Nations, 1948)
The activity of the international community on ratifying the many human rights treaties
gives the UDHR legitimacy from a legal standpoint. As parties of the United Nations, and
ratifiers of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, states make a contractual
agreement to protect the human rights of their citizens. This shows that the state has not
only an awareness of the terms to which they are agreeing, but also a willingness to
commit to human rights protections. Thus, regardless of cultural or religious differences
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between states, states are still willing to commit to human rights protections. The various
states that have ratified the document have not only agreed on the terms of the document
by doing so, but have also conceded that the state itself has a responsibility to protect
human rights. Because of the contractual nature of human rights treaties, looking at the
legal aspects of human rights establishes the best argument for the universality of human
rights.
While the Universal Declaration of Human Rights has normative roots, the
legality of the document solidifies its legitimacy. Rather than stating that states should
protect human rights because it is the right thing to do, or relieve states of their duties to
protect human rights based on cultural arguments, the legal nature of human rights
treaties supports the argument that states should protect rights because such a large
majority of states agree to do so. While not every state in the international community has
ratified every human rights treaty, enough states of varying cultures and religions have to
assume that cultural and religious traditions that opposed human rights are not enough to
keep states from legally committing to human rights protections. Because of this,
universality -- at least in terms of a standard body of principles -- can be assumed when
discussing human rights.
Despite arguments against the universality of human rights, it has been well
established in international law, and in state commitments to human rights treaties. This
is crucial to recognize, as this acknowledgement necessarily leads to a state duty to
protect human rights. Without recognizing the universality of human rights, then there is
essentially no responsibility for states to strive to protect human rights. Because of this,
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this thesis will presume universality of human rights, which also leads to a presumed duty
of states to protect human rights.
Next, I will consider the issue of compliance, and look specifically at why states
do or do not comply with the international treaties they have ratified. I will do this by
looking at treaty compliance in general, specifically how it is affected by the structure of
the international community and state interest. This will later be applicable in examining
why some states comply with human rights treaties while others do not.
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Chapter 3 – Compliance
Introduction
Human rights treaties aim to protect human rights by recruiting states to agree to
certain obligations. However, the question arises whether these treaties are effective.
Human rights treaties, like treaties in other issue areas, are plagued with a lack of
compliance. Realists would argue that it could even be questioned whether compliance
can actually be expected in the international system with its anarchical nature. Since there
is no central law-making body, and also no central law-enforcing body, how can one
expect states to comply with international law? Aside from the lack of a central
governing body, a lack of compliance could also be a result of changing state interests, or
interests which lie opposed to the interests outlined in a ratified treaty. This is reflected in
arguments made by world-systems analysis theorists, such as Wallerstein, who argue that
treaties are tools used by core states to control periphery states. With these complexities
of the international system and state interests compliance can be difficult to achieve.
The reasons for compliance stated above reflect two ways of studying treaty
compliance: by using a system level of analysis and a state level of analysis. A system
level of analysis focuses on the characteristics of the international community which
contribute to noncompliance. This is seen in scholarship that explains noncompliance as a
result of the structure of the international system, specifically its anarchical structure and
its lack of a central governing body. The state analysis focuses on state characteristics
which lead to noncompliance, such as changing state interests. I will utilize both levels of
analysis to give reasons for noncompliance with human rights treaties. After this is done,
I will also discuss the consequences of noncompliance. Ultimately, I come to the

16

conclusion that studying compliance with human rights treaties specifically is best
conducted with a state level of analysis as it gives more insight into specific state issues
that lead to noncompliance.
Noncompliance – System Level of Analysis
Structure of the International Community
Compliance with international treaties is often studied, and various theories exist
regarding why state actors sign treaties and what leads to compliance, or lack of. Some of
these studies focus on the characteristics of the international system, and how particular
characteristics lead to noncompliance. In other words, they use an international system
level of analysis. One way of using the system level of analysis to study human rights
treaty compliance is by using Wallersteins’s (1974) world-system analysis, which divides
the international community into three types of states: core, semi-periphery and
periphery. The core states are those that are most powerful within the system, such as the
United States and Great Britain. Periphery states are those that are least power and are
often exploited by the core states. The semi-periphery states create a buffer area between
the core and periphery states, not having as much power as the core states, but also not as
disadvantaged as the periphery states. The core states are not only the most developed
states, but they also have the most legal power in the international community with a
greater percentage of core states being represented in international law-making bodies.
Using this model, one could argue that the structure of the international system gives
more treaty drafting power to core states (Chayes & Chayes, 1993). Naturally the core
states are going to draft treaties that fall in line with their state interests. Because of their
power in the international community, the core states are able to draft treaties and then

17

coerce less powerful states into singing the treaties. While these treaties may reflect the
interests of more powerful states, they do not represent the interests of all the less
powerful states that were goaded to sign the treaties. This leads to noncompliance by less
powerful states because often the ratified treaties will lie counter to their state interests,
giving the state very little incentive to fully comply. In this case, the cause of
noncompliance is not necessarily the state interests, but rather the structure of the system.
Due to the periphery states’ position in the international community they are coerced into
signing treaties that lie in contrast to their interests. Rather than having the ability to
contribute to the drafting of international treaties, periphery states are expected to ratify
and comply with treaties drafted by core states. Examining this situation with a system
level of analysis leads researchers to believe the noncompliance is a result of the
hierarchical structure of the international community (Chayes & Chayes, 1993, p. 83).
Thus if peripheral states were given the opportunity to contribute to treaty drafting,
perhaps they would be more compliant with the treaties they are encouraged to ratify.
Realists cite another characteristic of the international system, its lack of a central
governing body or enforcement agency, as hampering compliance with international law.
A classical realist would argue that compliance and cooperation shouldn’t be expected in
an anarchical international system. To realists, while the term “international community”
is used often, no such community actually exists. According to Karl Meyer (1999), the
international community consists of one super power, the United States, about a dozen
pivotal states, and about 150 smaller, weaker, and dependent states. This reflects the
argument made by Wallerstein regarding the structure of the international community,
although Meyer uses this structure to make a different argument. Since the international
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community has no enforcement agency, the pivotal states, who are not as disadvantaged
as the weak dependent tates, consistently get away with noncompliance with human
rights treaties. No punishment exists for noncompliance with international treaties and
thus the pivotal states are able to shirk on their obligations under the treaties they have
ratified. The pivotal states specifically are able to do this because they are the superior
powers (aside from the United States) in the international community. Meyer discusses
Turkey and the Kurds, Russia and the Chechens, and China and the Tibetans as examples
of pivotal states that have denied massive amounts of people their human rights. Each
state was noncompliant with the human rights treaties they had ratified. Even though
these states were legally bound to the treaties they had ratified, no enforcement
mechanism exists to ensure treaty compliance. These states simply received a pass on
their human rights abuses while harsher measures are put in place by the pivotal states to
enforce human rights treaties in the smaller, weaker states. The pivotal states are able to
put international pressure on the weaker states to remain compliant with their human
rights treaties, however, little international pressure is placed on pivotal states to comply
with their human rights treaties. This shows the inequality in international justice, and
sheds light on the fact that equal enforcement of international law is difficult to attain.
While world-system analysis and realism have different views regarding the
structure of the international system, both come to similar conclusions. Both schools
ultimately believe that states will continue to be noncompliant with many of the treaties
they sign, although they come to this conclusion in different ways.
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Collective Action Problem
Another reason why the international system lacks enforcement is due to a
collective action problem. Compliance with treaties is hardly ever enforced because
“foreign governments face severe collective action costs when it comes to paying the
military, economic, or diplomatic costs of enforcement” (Simmons, 2009, p. 115).
Interfering in a foreign state’s affairs is accompanied with many costs. For example,
support for military action is needed if a state plans on stationing troops in a foreign state.
Furthermore, there are political and diplomatic costs of enforcement. Because of these
costs, multiple states are often needed to enforce treaty compliance. However, few states
are willing to pay the costs, and rather hope another state will enforce the treaty instead.
Ultimately little is done by states in the area of human rights treaties enforcement. Even
in the most egregious cases of human rights abuses, such as those that took place in
Rwanda, or are currently taking place in Darfur, states are extremely hesitant to get
involved diplomatically. The hope is always that another state will intervene and thus
cover the costs of intervention. This collective action problem shows how the anarchical
nature of the international system makes it difficult for foreign governments to mobilize
to enforce international law. With the various competing interests from each government,
as well as various diplomatic, economic and military capabilities of each state, the
formation of a unified enforcement agency is not typically successful.
Naming and Shaming
With the lack of an enforcement agency in the international system and the
collective action problem that exists with state interventions, some theorists argue that
compliance is encouraged in other ways. One way compliance with treaties is encouraged
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is through “naming and shaming”. This occurs when violators of international treaties are
exposed and shamed in the international community. Various NGO’s with stakes in
various issue areas participate in the practice of naming and shaming. Within the issue
area of human rights, Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch are most often
noted. These organizations work to expose human rights violations by governments and
then rally groups against the states that experience severe violations. While anecdotes
exist to show that in some cases governments do decrease noncompliance when they are
shamed in the international community, some scholars, like Emilie Hafner-Burton
(2008), question whether naming and shaming is effective in reducing human rights
abuses.
According to Hafner-Burton’s research (2008), naming and shaming has mixed
results. In most cases, governments that are exposed for human rights abuses continue
those abuses or actually increase abuses. The cause of increased human rights abuses by a
government lies in the domestic unrest caused by exposing human rights abuses. The
exposed abuses anger the citizens of the state that are experiencing the abuses, and often
human rights NGO’s will appeal to the citizens of a state to make them more aware of the
noncompliance of their government. The exposure encourages citizens to rally against
the abusive government, often causing national unrest. This unrest threatens the
government and thus causes the government to react with further abuses to suppress the
complaints and grievances expressed by the citizens. This type of government response is
especially common during an election or territorial dispute, situations which involve high
stakes issues to government officials. The costs of losing an election or territorial dispute
are much higher than the costs associated with being shamed in the international
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community. Because of this, the government is anxious to respond with force before
citizens are able to further mobilize (p. 4).
These studies on international compliance focus on the system level of analysis.
Each points out a characteristic of the international system which leads to
noncompliance. However, it seems as though this level of analysis is not very useful in
determining solutions for noncompliance. Many problems are faced when turning to the
international community to remedy the problem of noncompliance. Because of these
problems, a state level of analysis should be used to determine why states are
noncompliant. Using a state level of analysis could lead to state level remedies that are
potentially more effective in encouraging compliance. This is evident in Hafner-Burton’s
analysis of naming and shaming as well. She states that often human rights abuses
increase after international shaming because of the domestic results of shaming. The
international response to treaty noncompliance caused further domestic human rights
abuses. Therefore, a state level of analysis is more appropriate for studying compliance
with international law. This level of analysis would target the causes of noncompliance at
the state level, which begs the study of state level remedies (especially since the
international community has very little ability to remedy noncompliance). A state level of
analysis of the causes of noncompliance could allow a more productive response to the
issue of noncompliance specifically with human rights treaties.
Noncompliance – State Level of Analysis
Introduction
Many researchers focus on a state level analysis of noncompliance, specifically
focusing on state interests. According to Beth Simmons (2009) “governments will not

22

honor international human rights treaties when it is not in their interest to do so” (p. 155).
If states do not comply with treaties they have ratified if it is not in their interest, then
why did they ratify the treaty to begin with? On the surface it does not make sense that a
state would ratify a treaty that is counter to state interest, yet there are several reasons a
state will do so. As mentioned previously, this could be a result of international pressure
by larger, more powerful states on smaller states to sign treaties that they otherwise
would not have signed. This answers the question with a system level of analysis.
However, there are many reasons to explain why states sign treaties counter to their
interests using a state level of analysis as well. In fact, using a state level analysis helps
researchers better understand why states ratify treaties as there are different state
characteristics which help explain motivation behind treaty ratification.
Treaty Ratification and State Interests
According to Beth Simmons (2009), there are three types of treaty ratifiers. Each
type ratifies treaties for different purposes. The first type of treaty ratifier is a sincere
ratifier. These states are in agreement with the content of the treaty and plan to comply
with the treaty. These states likely ratify treaties that already align with state interests. In
the case of human rights treaties, sincere ratifiers are likely to be democracies which
already strive to protect the rights of citizens. These states have low costs associated with
ratifying the treaty because in many cases they are either already implementing parts of
the treaty, or at least have the institutional capabilities to do so. While not every sincere
ratifier is a developed, democratic state with capabilities to easily comply with treaties,
the majority are.
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The second group of ratifiers is a group of states which make up “false
negatives.” Simmons explains that these are states which may already be adhering to the
principles of the treaty domestically, but they fail to officially ratify international treaties
for various reasons. According to Simmons the United States offers an example of a false
negative state. The United States often refuses to sign international treaties, such as the
Committee of the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), even though
the United State adheres to many domestic laws which align with the values in the treaty.
False negatives are at times weary of officially ratifying treaties for fears of a loss of
sovereignty or control. While treaty ratification costs would still remain low, the state
refuses to ratify for political reasons.
The third group of ratifiers consists of strategic ratifiers. These states ratify
treaties because they are coerced to do so by other states, or simply because they want to
avoid criticism. These are, in a sense, meaningless commitments, also referred to by
Simmons as “false positives”. These states are focused on the immediate diplomatic
benefits of ratifying a treaty as opposed to focusing on the goals and values of a treaty.
Also, research suggests that concern over reputation leads a state to strategically ratify a
treaty (Downs & Jones, 2002, p. 95). Furthermore, there are tangible benefits to ratifying
treaties such as investment from other governments. Also, membership into some IGO’s
requires treaty ratification. These benefits lead states into ratifying treaties that may not
have otherwise, and may not have the capabilities or the interest in upholding the treaty.
Noncompliance and State Interests
Strategic ratifiers, by definition, are ratifiers of the treaty but are not compliant.
For these states the costs of not ratifying the treaty outweigh the costs of noncompliance.
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This is not to say that there are no costs to noncompliance, certainly there are. These
states, however, are simply not concerned with the costs. They have a short time horizon,
meaning that are more concerned with immediate costs than future costs. Furthermore,
governments that are strategic ratifiers often are out of power by the time the
consequences for noncompliance affect their state.
These explanations help clarify why states ratify treaties. However, according to
Simmons most states fall under the category of sincere ratifiers. Meaning most states
ratify treaties with the intention of complying. While many states sincerely ratify treaties,
some are still noncompliant with treaties for various reasons. As stated earlier,
“governments will not honor international human rights treaties when it is not in their
interest to do so” (Simmons, 2009, p.155). If most states ratify a treaty fully intending to
comply with its measures, and then are noncompliant with some aspects of it, this must
indicate a change in state interest from the time of ratification. How do state interests
change? There are three reasons why state interests may change from the time of treaty
ratification.
Changing State Interests
One reason why state interest would be opposed to the interests outlined in
ratified treaties would be that there is often ambiguity in the treaty language. Political
circumstances and economies can change rapidly in a state, and often the treaty language
is too ambiguous to determine how to respond to new problems within a state. For
example, the treaty might reflect state interests at the time of ratification, but after a quick
change in state interests due to political or economic circumstances, the state fails to
remain compliant with the treaty. While the state had originally complied with the treaty,
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the treaty language may be too vague to be able to interpret how new state interests fit
with treaty guidelines. This involves a reaction time during which the state must figure
out how to respond. In this case the state is not being willfully noncompliant. Rather, the
state simply does not know where their interest would fit in with the interests of the
treaty, since the state interests have changed since ratification (Chayes & Chayes, 1993).
Furthermore, treaties are often left ambiguous for political reasons. Specifically,
more states agree to ratify a treaty if it is less detailed, which allows states to adopt
various positions as to the meaning of their obligations (Chayes & Chayes, 1993, p. 189).
In this case, organizations are able to get more states to sign treaties because there is less
risk associated with ratification. With an ambiguous treaty states are left with room for
interpretation. In this situation there is less cost of ratification since states feel as though
they are not surrendering as much sovereignty. However, if a state acts in a way that
other states would perceive as counter to the treaty, these acts are still seen as
noncompliance, regardless if the acting state agrees. Ultimately vague wording in treaties
allows states to interpret the treaty differently depending on changing political and
economic conditions within the state. However, if state actions are not agreed to be in
line with the treaty interests by other states in the international community, questionable
actions could very well be seen as noncompliant.
Lack of Capabilities to Comply With Treaties
A second reason, according to Chayes and Chayes (1993), for noncompliance
with treaties is a lack of capability to carry out the provisions of the treaty (p. 193). Often,
smaller, developing states are unable to comply with international treaties because they
simply lack the capability to do so. In this case, while the state sincerely ratified the
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treaty and intended on complying, a lack of capability to do so increased the costs
associated with compliance. In these cases of high costs with treaty compliance, it is
often not in the interest of the state to comply (Hathaway, 2007). Chayes and Chayes give
the example of the Montreal Protocol. After the treaty was signed, only half the states had
complied with the provision to report all CFC consumption. Experts discovered that a
large majority of the non-reporting states were developing states that could not track CFC
consumption without technical aid from the treaty organization. While they were not
intentionally being noncompliant, they were not given the tools necessary for
compliance. For states that lack capabilities to comply with treaties, ratification comes
with high costs. Ratifying states would have to gain capabilities to comply with the treaty
which could mean having to alter many domestic institutions. Many states lack the means
to do so. However, these costs do not prevent them from ratifying. These states may
ratify treaties for any of the aforementioned reasons: international pressure, strategy,
diplomatic benefits, etc. While the states may be aware they lack the capabilities to
comply, they may not always. Noncompliance in these cases may be intentional, but there
are also cases where noncompliance is unintentional.
Treaty Compliance Takes Time
Lastly, Chayes and Chayes (1993) point out that treaties are intended to affect
state action over a given period of time, and therefore a single snapshot of state behavior
may not accurately depict state compliance. For this reason, it may appear that states are
noncompliant with treaties and that their interest lie opposed to the treaty. However,
states sometimes take time to adjust their interests to align with treaty obligations. Often
it takes states years to fully comply with international treaties. In many cases states must
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alter existing institutions or implement new domestic policies to be fully compliant.
These types of state alterations take time and funding. These changes do not take place
immediately. Because of this, immediate snapshots of state compliance are sometimes
inaccurate, since a state may be in the middle of a transition process. Rather, analyses
should be done over a period of time to measure change towards compliance. Chayes and
Chayes argue that a transition period is necessary when considering treaty compliance,
and most treaties allow time for states to transition into compliance, during which
noncompliance is more or less forgiven since state interests are in the process of
adjusting.
The state level of analysis used in this chapter to analyze noncompliance will now
be more focused on specific government types in chapter four. Specifically, the links
between democracy, compliance and human rights practices will be considered. The
various issues mentioned in this chapter, such as state interests, institutional capabilities
and time, all are intertwined with the topic of the next chapter. A closer look at specific
government types will shed light on why some states are compliant, while others are not.
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Chapter 4 – State Level of Analysis: Regime Type
Introduction
If a state level of analysis is more appropriate for determining why states ratify
treaties and why some are later noncompliant, then perhaps a state level of analysis needs
to be used to determine ways to engage states in treaty compliance. What characteristics
of the state contribute to noncompliance, and how can these characteristics be altered to
be more conducive to compliance? For the states that are strategic ratifiers and do not
intend on being compliant with the treaty, an institution needs to be in place to keep them
accountable to their treaty commitments. Since no formal international enforcement
exists, ideally enforcement would lie in the state itself. Specifically, citizens who elect the
noncompliant government should be able to hold that government accountable.
Of course, to say that the citizens of a state should have a certain level of power to
hold their governments accountable implies a certain level of democracy. As mentioned
earlier, many scholars would argue that the very concept of human rights is liberal in
nature. If this is the case, then certainly a democratic regime would seem to be more able,
and more willing, to protect human rights and comply with international human rights
treaties. It would also seem that the costs of noncompliance are much higher in
democratic states, where the citizens could penalize the government for noncompliance.
The role of democracy and specific institutions utilized by citizens to hold governments
accountable should be looked at and their success in encouraging compliance should be
measured. Looking at regime type provides a more specific analysis of characteristics of
the state.
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Regime Type and Compliance
Introduction
The question of why some states comply with international law, while others do
not, is a topic of much scholarly contention. In terms of regime type, democratic
governance is generally linked to respect for human rights (Poe & Tate, 1994). At the
most basic level both democracy and human rights have many roots in liberalism. A state
regime will reflect how closely a state adheres to liberalism. For example, a democratic
regime would be expected to be more compliant with human rights treaties, while an
autocratic regime would not. By examining human rights treaty compliance across
different regime types, one can determine whether there is actually a relationship between
regime type and compliance.
Human Rights and Liberalism
The liberal roots of human rights are seen through various studies on human
rights. According to Howard and Donnelly (1986), human rights are “the equal and
inalienable rights, in the strong sense of entitlements that ground particularly powerful
claims against the state, that each person has simply as a human being” (p. 802) The
concept of human rights can easily be pulled from liberal theory in regards to the
individual and the protection the individual is entitled to from the state. Human rights
also have roots in natural law, which is considered a liberal theory. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948) declares in Article 3 that “Everyone has the right to
life, liberty and security of person.” Similar natural rights doctrine is seen in John
Locke’s Second Treatise of Government (1690) in which Locke argues that everyone is
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entitled to certain inalienable rights that are endowed by a creator: life, liberty and
property. The liberal aspects of human rights cannot be denied.
Along these lines, the expectation is that liberal, or democratic, regimes will be
the most active states in ratifying human rights treaties, adopting constitutional provisions
which protect human rights, and most importantly actively protecting human rights.
While Howard and Donnelly place a heavy emphasis on regime type, they do not parse
out different types of liberal regimes, or specific institutions within liberal regimes.
Rather, they look at liberal regimes in general, not paying attention to the fact that many
liberal regimes vary significantly in build and in practice. To suggest that all liberal
regimes should have better human rights practices is to suggest that all liberal regimes
have the same institutions which allow for more human rights protections. This becomes
problematic when studies suggest that the human rights records of democratic regimes
are mixed, also suggesting that democratic, or liberal, regimes vary in their ability to
protect human rights.
Human Rights and Democracy
Ideally, it would seem that democracies would have better human rights records.
If the concept of human rights is strongly tied to liberal theory (Howard & Donnelly,
1986), then it seems intuitive that democracies would best protect human rights. The
liberal ideals that permeate democratic governments are ones which advocate protection
of basic human rights, as well as civil liberties. Individuals tend to cooperate naturally,
and governments are established to cater to the needs of the citizenry. Democracy also
influences compliance with human rights treaties in its processes. International treaties
are most often enforced domestically, not internationally (Powell & Staton, 2009, p. 151).
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This is due to the anarchical nature of the international system as explained earlier.
Because international treaties are enforced domestically, Democracies tend to be
more compliant for two main reasons. First, constituents “punish” representatives for
violating treaties, and democratic regimes provide more institutional mechanisms through
which citizens can hold their government accountable to their treaty obligations (Keith,
2002, p. 122). Second, democracies tend to be more compliant with their human rights
treaties because of the domestic legal framework established in democratic states. For
example, democracies tend to incorporate international law into their domestic
constitutions more often, and have enforcement mechanisms to ensure the laws are
respected (Powell & Staton, 2009, p. 152). These two explanations briefly look at various
aspects of democracy that may make democratic regimes more compliant with human
rights treaties.
When observing the relationship between human rights and democracy, it is
important to define democracy. Democracy is flooded with conceptual obscurity.
Definitions of democracy vary greatly. Is democracy dichotomous or a continuum?
According to the Polity IV project, democracy is measured on a continuum, assigning
states a score on a range from -10 to +10. The spectrum is divided from -10 to -6 being
autocracies, -5 to + 5 indicating anocracies and +6 to +10 indicating democracies. (Polity
IV Project, 2010). Freedom house measures democracy on a similar continuum, placing
states in one of three categories: free, partly free or not free (Freedom House, 2006).
Bueno de Mesquita, George Downs, Alastair Smith, and Feryal Marie Cherif (2005)
discuss various multidimensional characteristics of democracy which would all need to
be present before a state could be declared fully democratic, such as “1) An allocation of
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power that is inclusive; (2) a scope of power that is liberal; (3) a balanced and dispersed
distribution of power; (4) elite recruitment that is egalitarian; (5) a sense of widely
diffused self-responsibility; (6) impartiality; and (7) decisions that are changeable” (p.
440) These definitions of democracy suggest that states do not fall into two categories:
democratic or non-democratic. Rather there is a range of characteristics that contribute to
democracy in a state, of which a particular state may only have a few, may have a lot or
may of none. Depending on how many democratic characteristics exist within a state lead
one to address how democratic that state is. Therefore states may be partially democratic,
fully democratic or non-democratic. Even in the partially democratic category there are
so many varying levels of democracy that it becomes impossible to say whether a state is
“democratic” or “non-democratic.” While most would agree that there are many complex
aspects of democracy which keep the term from being dichotomous, the complexities
convolute the conceptualization of democracy, making it difficult to measure and define.
Since democracy in general is not at the crux of my argument, I will assume that
democracy is a continuum, as opposed to a discrete variable, but will not explore further
the various aspects that make a state democratic. The only institution of democracy I will
explore further is judicial independence, which will be addressed at a later time.
According to Bruce Bueno De Mesquita et al. (2005) on democracies and human
rights practices, the relationship between democracy and human rights treaty compliance
is not linear (p. 440). They do find a statistically significant relationship between
democracy and human rights compliance, however this is only present in states with fullfledged democracies. They did not find the same relationship within states that simply
made an improvement in the level of democracy or had a weak democracy. They argue
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that the accountability in full-fledged democracies appears to be what causes states to
promote human rights protections, while this same level of accountability is not present
in weaker democracies. Jenifer Whitten-Woodring (2009) echoes Bueno De Mesquita et
al. in saying that the relationship between human rights and democracy is not linear.
Rather there is a threshold of democracy, below which, democracy does not improve
respect for human rights.
This relationship implies that in many instances there are democratic regimes with
practices and characteristics that are non-democratic. Thus when democracies violate
human rights, this isn’t necessarily a failure of democracy. Rather, it could be argued that
the state has relied on its non-democratic attributes. It would seem that if a state were
fully democratic and completely reliant upon its democratic characteristics, it would not
experience human rights abuses since they lie counter to the very liberal nature of
democracy. Because democracies still experience human rights abuses, it could be
assumed that these states are either not fully democratic, or not fully reliant on their
democratic characteristics in their decision-making. Especially in the case of transitioning
or weaker democracies, the state is more likely to make decisions based on its nondemocratic attributes as opposed to democratic ones.
Democracy: Necessary but not Sufficient?
The findings by Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005) regarding the non-linear
relationship between democracy and respect for human rights, and the conceptual
obscurity of the term “democracy” lead me to believe that research should rather focus on
the mechanisms within a democracy that contribute to accountability. While democracies
are typically more compliant with human rights treaties they still experience systematic
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human rights violations, thus suggesting that democracy is not a sufficient condition for
human rights protections. Emilia Justyna Powell and Jefrey K. Staton (2009) echo this,
showing proof that democracies are not immune to human rights abuses. Their research
focuses on the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), and under what conditions states are most likely to
violate their obligations under the CAT. They find that regardless of regime type, states
routinely violate their obligations under the CAT. “81 percent of ratifying states violated
the convention in the very year of ratification, including 78 percent of the democratic
ratifiers” (p. 150). These are astounding numbers. While democracies overall have better
human rights track records (Bueno de Mesquita et al., 2005), there still exists a lack of
accountability which keeps governments acting in obligation to their ratified human
rights treaties.
If a state level of analysis is not sufficient in explaining human rights treaty
compliance, then perhaps a closer look at institutions will provide more insight into why
some states are compliant while others are not. This argument is reflected by research
done by Oona Hathaway (2007), who states that “human rights treaties are most likely to
be effective where there is domestic legal enforcement of treaty commitments” (p. 593)
Domestic legal enforcement of treaty commitments does imply some level of democracy.
Furthermore, research conducted by Wade Cole (2005) shows that domestic enforcement
mechanisms of a state largely affect whether a state is compliant with their treaty
obligations (p. 472). This research suggests that domestic institutions do have a great
affect on state compliance with treaty obligations.
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While much research is done on compliance with international law, only limited
insights are provided into the specific mechanisms through which regimes may support
compliance. If the purpose of research on this topic is to find ways to lead states to
become more compliant with their treaty obligations, then research should focus on ways
to hold states accountable to their obligations. The international community is incapable
of enforcing compliance by states that do not intend to comply upon ratification or by
states whose interests lie opposite of treaty values. There exists no formal enforcement
agency, naming and shaming often leads to increased noncompliance and while
diplomatic benefits entice states to ratify treaties they are not compelling enough to
ensure compliance. If the international community is incapable of holding states
accountable to their human rights treaty obligations, then perhaps the citizens of states
should be equipped with the necessary tools to provide a check on their government.
Focus should be placed on institutions that equip citizens to hold their governments
accountable, specifically the institution of the judiciary.
Towards that end, I posit that the nature of this institution, specifically whether or
not a state has an independent judiciary, plays a key role in holding a state accountable
for protecting the human rights of its populace and this complying with human rights
treaties. The next section will further explicate the role of judicial independence in
ensuring compliance.
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Chapter 5 – Judicial Independence
Introduction
The executive and legislature are often focused on in studies of democratic
institutions; however the judiciary is less recognized. Yet, its importance is undeniable.
The judiciary is essential to the viability of democracies (Staats, Bowler and Hiskey,
2005). In order to move forward with this discussion of judicial independence and
democracy, first judicial independence needs to be defined. According to Arun Chatterjee
(1973), a judiciary is independent when “the judge has no other superior except the law”
(p. 65) It is crucial that the judiciary is not subject to any power besides the law. Judges
and justices must have the opportunity to give their preferences and opinions without
facing retaliation measures by the legislature or executive (Iaryczower, Spiller, Tomasi,
2002, p. 699). “This depends not only on political constraints face by the court, but also
the justice’s political alignment. Political alignment…depends on both the nomination
process, and turnover in the court” (Iaryczower et al., 2002, p. 700). Ideally, judges and
justices will not have a political alignment, thus making them independent of any
persuasions aside from the law.
Independent judges have a responsibility to guard the principle of constitutionality
and legality and provide checks and balances. Second, the independent judiciary is
responsible for resolving disputes and protecting rights (Domingo, 2000, p. 708). A
political alignment could possibly lead judges or justices to rule based on political
alignment as opposed to making an unbiased decision based on their interpretation of the
law, rendering them inadequate to execute their responsibilities. Iaryczower et al. (2002)
argue that judges with shorter tenures will naturally tend towards being aligned with
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appointing powers, which would lead to a political alignment with those with the
authority of appointment. Furthermore, elected judges will be working towards
reelection, which would lead to a political alignment with the constituency that elects.
Thus, the most independent judiciaries are made of appointed judges with a long tenure
who have no ties to a constituency and do not tend to align with appointing authorities.
Considering these definitions of judicial independence and the responsibilities of
independent judges, an independent judiciary is one in which the judges are not elected,
but rather appointed. Also, the judges must not be manipulated or pressured by the
powers in the other branches. Lastly, judges should have reasonably long tenures, which
is later defined and explained by my measurements as more than seven years.
Judicial Independence and Human Rights
Ultimately in measuring the success of judiciaries, three facets need to be
considered: the level of independence, efficiency and accessibility. “Each of these
dimensions is viewed as having a strong theoretical link to the ability of the judiciary to
ensure the democratic regime” (Staats, Bowler, & Hiskey, 2005, p. 79). In a study done
by Staats et al. (2005), they tested the correlations of 11 variables relating to judicial
performance. Their findings show that the level of judicial independence has a positive
correlation to “effectiveness regarding civil liberties” and “effectiveness regarding equal
justice.” The study was conducted with an index of Latin American judiciaries. These
variables seemingly would be the ones considered for human rights compliance research,
since many measures of human rights reflect how well the government respects rights
which would often be considered forms of civil liberties. Human rights such as these
would include the right to “free speech, freedom of association and assembly, freedom of
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movement, freedom of religion, and the right to participate in the selection of government
leaders” (CIRI, 2011). This relationship between judicial performance and effectiveness
protecting civil liberties is a microcosm of the larger relationship between judicial
independence and human rights. Thus, the judiciary could very well be a mechanism that
holds states accountable to their obligations under the human rights treaties they have
ratified.
Further research by Linda Keith also suggests that increases in judicial
independence would lead to more protections of human rights. Keith examines multiple
elements of judicial independence and runs a regression analysis to determine the impact
judicial independence has on human rights. While her results were somewhat mixed in
terms of strength, overall each of the elements of judicial independence had at least a
slight positive relationship with human rights practices, while four of the seven elements
of judicial independence had a statistically significant positive relationship with human
rights practices (Keith, 2002, p. 5). Also, according to Keith’s research, the
implementation of constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary has been
increasing since the Cold War. This is significant because it creates a specific time frame
researches can look at when studying the relationship of independent judiciaries with
human rights practices. As more states adopt constitutional provisions providing for an
independent judiciary, there should be an increase in the respect for human rights. Keith
used seven characteristics to define judicial independence: guaranteed terms (or
constitutional provisions), finality of decisions, exclusive authority, ban against
exceptional or military courts, fiscal authority, separation of powers, and enumerated
qualifications. While only four of the seven measures of judicial independence had a

39

statistically significant relationship with human rights practices, this is still significant in
that it shows that the judiciary does affect state behavior regarding human rights. It
should also be noted that implementing independent judiciaries is a costly and time
consuming process. The process “involves a wide range of steps, from the drafting of
legislation to the training of judges and lawyers and the modernization of court systems,
police forces and prisons” (United Nations, 1996). Because of the lengthy process, results
may not be seen immediately. Therefore further research should continue to be conducted
in this area to test the effect judiciaries have on human rights as they emerge and evolve
into fully functioning independent judiciaries. Relationships that did not exist strongly
when Keith conducted her study may evolve as time lapses from the implementation of
the constitutional provisions for an independent judiciary.
Powell and Staton (2009) also come to the conclusion that a functioning judiciary
is a democratic institution capable of placing restraints on the state, keeping it
accountable to its human rights agreements (p. 154). While they discuss various
characteristics of judicial independence, they ultimately measure this by measuring
judicial effectiveness. Judicial effectiveness is defined as a judiciary that “constitutes a
genuine constraint on state behavior.” Furthermore, the judiciary must be willing and
capable of imposing penalties for human rights violations. Their findings reflect that
when a state judicial system is effective, there are fewer violations of human rights
treaties in states (p. 167). Interestingly, their findings also show a positive relationship
between judicial effectiveness and the probability of not ratifying and human rights
violations. In other words, judicial effectiveness could increase compliance with human
rights treaties, but it also increases the likelihood that a state will not ratify a treaty and
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continue to violate human rights. In this case the institution that encourages human rights
protections also prevents states from ratifying new treaties (p. 167). Though they do
provide insights into the linkages between the judicial branch and compliance, they do so
by focusing on judicial effectiveness, rather than judicial independence. Judicial
independence is one aspect of judicial effectiveness. Specifically, judicial independence
is a measure of structural aspects of the judiciary – how judges are elected, how they act
in office, etc. This measure does not look at outcomes of the judiciary as judicial
effectiveness does. The particular variable of judicial independence, specifically the
structure of the judiciary in a state, is of specific importance, and should be considered
separately from overall judicial effectiveness. Judicial independence is a necessary
condition for judicial effectiveness. While Powell and Staton’s research does not
specifically reflect mine, their findings are extremely important and solidify the argument
that the judiciary is a critical domestic institution capable of affecting international
human rights treaty compliance.
Other researchers have found similar results. During democratic reforms in El
Salvador, judicial reforms were greatly encouraged as a way to protect human rights
(Jackson, Dodson & O’Shaughnessy, 1999). The people living in El Salvador at the time
were not satisfied with the level of independence practiced by the judiciary, and believed
that the judiciary was not holding the state accountable to its treaty obligations. Using
survey data, information was collected regarding the public’s feelings regarding the
judiciary. A large discrepancy existed between how the public believed the judiciary
“ought” to function and how the judiciary was actually functioning. The public wanted
reform in the judiciary to expand the protection of human rights. Furthermore, in Latin
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America in general over 60% of citizens express “little” or “no confidence” in the
judiciary across numerous surveys (Staats et al., 2005). These survey results show that
the people of El Salvador were aware of the practices of the judiciary and were not
content with the manner in which the judiciary was functioning.
These studies show that citizens are aware of the actions of the judiciary, and look
to the judiciary to legitimize their state governments. This is important in the protection
of human rights because citizens view the judiciary as a way to hold the executive and
legislative accountable to their responsibilities. They also look to the judiciary to provide
a check on the executive and legislative power. If citizens have little or no confidence in
their judiciary, it is likely because the judiciary is not functioning in a way which allows
for the protection of their rights. Thus, the judiciary is important in providing citizens
with the security that their rights will be protected, as well as to give legitimacy to the
actions of the executive and legislative branches.
Similar to the situation in El Salvador, from 1917-1994, constitutional reforms in
Mexico made judicial independence difficult to attain, leading to a passive judiciary
characterized by submission to the executive (Domingo, 2000). During this time it was
argued that the Mexican government was not only illegitimate, but also careless in the
protection of citizens’ rights. Mexican citizens even believed that the federal government
was illegitimate due to the political nature of the judiciary. Ultimately the judiciary was
extremely important in portraying the legitimacy of the state. When unable to hold the
executive and legislature accountable for their decisions and actions, the judiciary
becomes nothing more than another political institution, leading to the feelings of distrust
the citizenry had of the government. This is because an independent judiciary “should
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guard the principles of constitutionality and legality, and provide checks and balances
against other branches of the state” (p.708). Without these capabilities, the state
government becomes unable to function in a way that is beneficial for its citizens. While
this research does not specifically relate to human rights practices, it does show the
importance of an independent judiciary, not only in protecting citizens, but also in
protecting the legitimacy of federal regimes.
The Judiciary as a Characteristic of Democracy
This distinction between majoritarian influences on democracy, such as elections,
and actual legal institutions of democracy, such as an independent judiciary, is critical. If
each separate democratic institution did not have independent effects on the outcome of
treaty ratification and compliance, then there would be no need to study them
independently. Rather, state level analyses, specifically those that look at regime type,
would provide conclusive evidence regarding democracies and their behavior regarding
human rights practices. This, however, is not the case, and thus distinctions between
institutions must be made. There are numerous democracies that hold popular elections
but do not have thriving independent judiciaries (Jackson, Dodson, & O’Shaughnessy,
1999). There are also numerous democracies that have thriving independent judiciaries,
but do not have fully functioning popular elections (Powell & Staton, 2009). Each
institution has unique effects on the regime as a whole. Popular elections in El Salvador
were not enough to satisfy the citizens’ desire for a democratic regime (Jackson et al.,
1999). Likewise, democratic regimes are not compliant with human rights treaties simply
because they hold popular elections. Rather, there is something unique about the judiciary
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which allows it to hold state accountable to their treaty obligations, making it a necessary,
although not a sufficient, condition for treaty compliance.
Governments are held accountable in two ways. The first is through horizontal
accountability. This accountability exists through other government institutions and is
defined as “the capacity of a network of relatively autonomous powers (i.e., other
institutions) that can call into question, and eventually punish, improper ways of
discharging the responsibilities of a given official” (Stapenhurst & O’Brien, 2007). The
judiciary functions as one institution that provides horizontal accountability. The second
type of accountability is vertical accountability. This type of accountability is the means
through which citizens hold their governments accountable to certain standards. The
judiciary can also function as an institution that provides vertical accountability, as it
gives citizens access to the government. These two forms of accountability relate and
interact with one another.
As discussed earlier, democracy can be thought of as a continuum. There are
states that are less democratic than others that are still considered democratic. In states
such as these, simply being a democratic state may not mean there are sufficient
mechanisms in the state to hold the government accountable to their obligations under
ratified human rights treaties. For example, Argentina has been given a score of ‘8’ from
Polity IV data project since 2003 (Authority Trends, 2011, Argentina). According to this,
Argentina would be considered democratic, and a fairly strong democracy as well.
However, Argentina still experiences widespread human rights abuses. In 2008 Argentina
experienced extrajudicial killings and violations of freedom of speech, as well as
widespread instances of torture (CIRI Human Rights Data Project, 1990-2010,

44

Argentina). Argentina has ratified various different human rights treaties (United Nations,
2011, “United”). From this, it can be concluded that Argentina is noncompliant with the
human rights treaties they have ratified. Argentina has regular, peaceful elections, with
the federal government having a certain level of accountability to the people. This is an
example of the aforementioned vertical accountability. However, when examining the
institution of the judiciary, it becomes very clear that Argentina’s judiciary is not
independent. Because of this, the federal government lacks a horizontal accountability to
other branches of the federal government. From this, it can be argued that without
horizontal accountability, means of vertical accountability are not effective.
In 1983 Argentina began the transition from an authoritarian regime toward
democracy. However, even though Argentina now maintains a democratic status with
regular elections for numerous government positions and a smoothly operating political
system, power in the federal government has been largely concentrated in the executive
branch. When President Menem took office in 1989 he began making constitutional
reforms which would weaken the checks the judiciary was able to place on the executive
branch. Menem began by offering prestigious positions to various Supreme Court justices
at the time, in hopes of inducing resignations. Menem was able to appoint one new
justice with this scheme, although that was not enough to reign in the power of the
judiciary as he had hoped. Menem then proposed a provision to congress which would
allow Menem to increase the number of justices from five to nine, allowing Menem to
appoint justices which would be partial to his policies, giving his a five person majority
in the court. Menem succeeded in the passing of the provisions, and appointed various
family friends and former colleagues to the positions in the Supreme Court. This gave
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Menem the power he hoped for in the Supreme Court, creating a court that was extremely
partial to the policies of the president, limiting the likelihood that the court would usurp
any of his decisions as President (Larkins, 1998, pp. 423-443).
With such a partial judiciary, horizontal accountability is not only sacrificed, but
in many ways vertical accountability is as well. Due to the partial and politicized
judiciary in Argentina, much of Argentina’s population no longer sees the federal
government as legitimate. According to a Gallup Poll taken in 1994, after the
constitutional provisions made by President Menem, 72% of respondents stated that
judges were too “influenced by the government,” while 69% stated that “the decisions of
the supreme court were either ‘extremely politicized’ or ‘very politicized.’” More
recently a poll conducted by Graciela Romer (1996) showed that “64 percent of
Argentines considered the Supreme Court either ‘very corrupt’ or ‘corrupt,’ and that 47
percent of respondents thought it was ‘obsolete.’” Overall, 87 percent of respondents
stated that they were “wholly unsatisfied with the state of justice in Argentina’” (as cited
in Larkins, 1998, p. 429).
The case of Argentina shows that while democracy is necessary for improvement
in human rights conditions (since human rights are inherently liberal, and need a liberaltype regime to function under), it is not a sufficient condition for treaty compliance, as
seen with the human rights violations that Argentina still experiences. According to
Christopher Larkins (1998), “the judiciary (vested with independence) enforces “the rule
of law,” which in turn leads to the secure functioning of constitutional democracy” (p.
436). Because of this, the stability of democratization and the functioning and practice of
democratic ideals rests on the establishment of an independent judiciary.
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Functions of the Judiciary
In order for a judiciary to be able to function adequately and independently, the
judiciary needs to have reasonable power to place checks on the executive and legislative
branches, and the judges need to be impartial to political persuasions. In the case of
Argentina, the judiciary was given plenty of power to make decisions. Their active role as
the judiciary was not limited. However, the judges were not impartial, thus rendering the
institution ineffective in serving as a check on the rest of the federal government. Rather,
the judiciary worked as a pawn of the executive, making decisions based solely on
political alliances with the party in power. This looks vastly different from how
judiciaries in authoritarian regimes tend to function. In the case of authoritarian regimes,
the judges tend to be fairly independent. “Authoritarian and semiauthoritarian regimes
often go to great lengths to respect the impartiality of their judges in order to attach a bit
of legitimacy to their rule” (Larkins, 1998). In this case the judges are nominated or
elected through independent channels, unlike the case of Argentina where family friends
or people of close political affiliation are nominated. Of course, executives of
authoritarian regimes are not willing to risk the judiciary limiting the scope of their
power. Because of this, the executive often times places heavy political pressure on
judges to make certain decisions or pass statutes to limit the institutional authority of the
judiciary. The judges may be elected independently, but once in office are forced to act as
an arm of the executive. Because of this, the judiciary is no longer a limit on the power of
the executive. In the case the judiciary is no longer able to function adequately or
independently.
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The independent judiciary needs to be established through constitutional
provision. The first reason for this is that constitutional provisions have very specific
channels through which they are modified, and often this process is lengthy and difficult
to achieve. This creates a permanency to judicial independence which is crucial for its
viability. In the example of Argentina, President Menem was able to adjust the number of
Supreme Court judges with ease, as the number of judges was not set in Argentina’s
constitution. With this, Menem was able to appoint judges that shared in his political ties.
Had a constitutional provision existed that established the number of judges, then perhaps
he would not have been able to change it with such ease. A second reason why
constitutional provisions regarding the judiciary are important is because it holds the
executive and legislature accountable to respecting the independence of the institution.
“In legal terms, [this] allows redress to be sought in the courts in the event of a law of
action undermining the independence of the judiciary” (Madhuku, 2002, p. 233).
Furthermore, in political terms it allows the public to criticize any action by the executive
of legislature attempting to interfere with the work of the judiciary. Interference with the
judiciary in states where the independence of the judiciary is mandated in a state
constitution is a legitimate reason to call for the removal of the current administration or
to call for a new administration at the soonest election.
The judiciary, as an institution, clearly has the ability to affect state practices and
is critical in protecting the rule of law. The case of Argentina shows that the relationship
between democracy and human rights protections is not as direct as some may argue.
Rather, many democracies, such as Argentina, remain noncompliant with their treaty
obligations. It also shows that when the independence of the judiciary is suppressed,
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human rights practices suffer as well. Because of this, I would like to now look
specifically at the relationship between judicial independence and human rights practices.
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Chapter 6 – Methods and Case Study
Introduction
Ultimately the regime level of analysis of human rights is entirely too broad.
When using this level of analysis there is no way to measure the various complexities that
come with the different institutions included in the make-up of the regime. These
institutions could ultimately reveal where the link between ratification and compliance is
broken. The judiciary, although understudied, is a vital institution in maintaining
democratic ideals in a state. Thus, my research will continue to focus on the judiciary,
and how it holds the executive and legislative accountable to their human rights treaty
obligations. This research will be conducted through an exploratory case study of Brazil,
and an evaluation of the independence of the judiciary and human rights treaty
compliance will be conducted. With only one case study being conducted, of course it
could be questioned whether the results of this case study would be generalizeable. First,
Brazil provides a unique case, in that it has two separately functioning judiciaries. Brazil
has a general judiciary that hears the majority of cases, and a military judiciary which
hears cases involving military personnel and the national police force. This distinction
becomes very important in my analysis. So, while the scope of the case study focuses on
one state, it examines two subsystems within the state. This does serve the ultimate
purpose of comparing separate judiciaries. Also, by focusing on separate subsystems
within one state, many other variables are held constant, such as culture, economy,
history, language and other state institutions. By holding these variables constant, it helps
ensure that the relationship between judicial independence and treaty compliance is being
measures. Furthermore, many states in Latin America still utilize a military court system.
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Because of this, the results of the case study can be used to make assumptions about the
relationship between judicial independence and human rights treaty compliance in the
various Latin American states that have a military court system.
Based off the previous research, I expect my findings to show a positive
correlation between judicial independence and treaty compliance. If this is the case, this
research could aid in the development of independent judiciaries world-wide.
Specifically, the findings could have strong implications for the development of a
judiciary in Iraq. The international community is heavily involved in the democratization
of Iraq, and knowing which mechanisms of a democratic regime are most conducive to
human rights protections could greatly aid in achieving the ultimate goals of
democratization and protection of human rights.
Case Study: Brazil
Introduction
Brazil is an ideal state to look at for numerous reasons. First, Brazil is a
democratic state that still experiences widespread human rights abuses. Because of this, it
provides a good example of why the regime level analysis is too broad for studying
compliance with human rights treaties. Furthermore, Brazil ideally should be capable of
protecting human rights for numerous reasons. First, Brazil completed its democratization
process in 1985, since having 26 years to develop institutions with are conducive to the
protection of human rights. Furthermore, Brazil does not lack the material resources
necessary for developing such institutions. Brazil has a GDP of $2.1 trillion and in 2010
experienced a growth rate of 7.5%. Brazil is also heavily involved in international trade,
which suggests it has numerous diplomatic ties which would give it an incentive to
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comply with the international human rights treaties it has ratified. These characteristics
make Brazil an ideal state to study when examining human rights practices.
Brazil is a federal republic consisting of 26 states and a federal district.
According to the Polity IV Regime Trends data, Brazil has been given a score of 8 since
1989, which falls under the “democracy” category (Authority Trends, 2011, Brazil).
However, According to the United States State Department, which releases annual human
rights reports of every country for which there is available data, Brazil has experienced
widespread human rights abuses since 1989. In the 2009 human rights report, it is stated
that:
The following human rights abuses were reported: unlawful killings; excessive
force, beatings, abuse, and torture of detainees and inmates by police and prison
security forces; inability to protect witnesses involved in criminal cases; harsh
prison conditions; prolonged pretrial detention and inordinate delays of trials;
reluctance to prosecute as well as inefficiency in prosecuting government officials
for corruption; violence and discrimination against women; violence against
children, including sexual abuse; trafficking in persons; discrimination against
indigenous persons and minorities; failure to enforce labor laws; forced labor; and
child labor in the informal sector. (Human Rights Report, 2010, Brazil)
If regime type is enough to explain human rights practices in a country, then Brazil
should be protecting the human rights of its citizens. This, however, is clearly not the
case. Brazil does have a legal obligation to protect the human rights of its citizens
because it has ratified various human rights treaties such as the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (ratified in 1952), the International
Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ratified in 1992), the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified in 1992), the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (ratified in 1984), the
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or
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Punishment (ratified in 1989), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (ratified in
1990), the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (ratified in 2008)
(United Nations Treaty Collection, 2011). Brazil has been very active in ratifying treaties
on human rights. However, Brazil continues to experience widespread human rights
abuses, especially in the area of physical integrity rights (rights against torture,
extrajudicial killings, disappearance, and political imprisonment).
Background and Human Rights Practices in Brazil
To provide some historical context regarding human rights practices in Brazil, I
will first give some background information of the government in Brazil and the
development of democracy in Brazil. Prior to 1982 Brazil maintained a presidential form
of government, marked with economic inflation, political violence and very little
government stability. In 1982 Brazil began a transition towards a democratic form of
government. This transition was further solidified in 1985 when the Brazilian Democratic
Movement Party won the office of the presidency. “Brazil completed its transition to a
democratically elected government in 1989, when Fernando Collor de Mello won 53% of
the vote in the first direct presidential election in 29 years” (Background Note: Brazil,
2010). In October, 2010, Brazil held its sixth consecutive presidential election since its
democratic reform in 1985.
Although Brazil has had a stable democratic government since 1985, it has failed
in many arenas to comply with its human rights treaty obligations. Data from the CIRI
Human Rights Dataset reveals a problematic record of human rights that constitutes a
significant departure from the intent of the numerous human rights treaties to which
Brazil committed. Since 1989 Brazil has scored a ‘0’ in the categories of “extrajudicial
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killings” and “torture,” meaning that every year since then Brazil has experienced at least
50 cases of human rights abuses in each of these areas (CIRI Human Rights Data Project,
1990-2010, Brazil). These abuses should not have occurred had Brazil remained
compliant with its treaty obligations under the various human rights treaties it has
ratified.
Brazil has a responsibility to protect its citizens from torture under the Convention
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
(CAT), which it ratified in 1989. Article two of this convention specifically states “Each
State Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to
prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction” (CAT, 1984). These are clear
terms that the state government of Brazil has a duty to protect its citizens from torture and
extrajudicial killings. Furthermore, Article 10 states
Each State Party shall ensure that education and information regarding the
prohibition against torture are fully included in the training of law enforcement
personnel, civil or military, medical personnel, public officials and other persons
who may be involved in the custody, interrogation or treatment of any individual
subjected to any form of arrest, detention or imprisonment. (CAT, 1984)
Not only does the government have the responsibility to implement policies which
prevent the torture and killing of its citizens, it has a responsibility to ensure that all law
enforcement personnel respect protections against torture as well.
One agency that is used in Brazil to train officers according to international
human rights standards is the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The
ICRC is a neutral, non-governmental organization that strives to ensure humanitarian
protection world-wide, especially in states that have experienced conflict and political
violence. ICRC has delegates in every state, and works to train governments and
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government bureaucrats in correct humanitarian practices that meet international
standards. The ICRC has a regional delegation in Brazil that works with Brazil’s armed
forces and police forces to teach them practices that protect human rights. The delegation
works to ensure the incorporation of international human rights law into local, federal
legislation (The Mandate and Mission of the ICRC, 2011).
The ICRC has worked with Brazilian police numerous times. In 1998 ICRC
implemented a training program through which it worked with the Brazilian Ministry of
Justice to provide adequate training for Brazil’s military policy officers. Brazil’s military
police are not a branch of the armed forces, but rather serves as Brazil’s federal police
force. The federal police force consists of 500,000 officers that are responsible for
maintaining public order and implementing legislation (Brazil: Police Instructors Learn
the Law, 2000). The course includes theoretical training in the norms of humanitarian law
and human rights practices, as well as practical training in how to perform police duties
without using excessive force. Since then, ICRC and the Brazilian Ministry of Justice
have continued to work with the military police in Brazil to help train them in appropriate
practices. This reflects at least some effort being made by the federal government to train
officers.
However, even though they are somewhat active in training their officers in
protecting human rights, the majority of the torture incidents in Brazil occur during
interactions between police and citizens. According to the 2009 Brazil country report,
“torture by police and prison guards remained a serious and widespread problem”
(Human Rights Report, 2010, Brazil). The report gives numerous cases of police officers
using torture during arrests and interrogations. While the Brazilian government has
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attempted to train officers to respect human rights, this clearly has not been enough to
prevent the abuses from occurring with overwhelming frequency.
While Brazil experiences widespread human rights abuses in the context of
physical integrity rights, it does an excellent job of ensuring that its citizens are
guaranteed their civil and political rights. In 2009 Brazil received the score of 2 on 9 out
of 10 civil and political rights, meaning there were no instances of violations of these
rights. Aggregating all the scores of civil and political rights, Brazil scored a total of 12
points out of 14. Since Brazil’s democratic reform in 1985, this aggregated score has only
fallen below 10 once (in 2008 Brazil scored a 9) (CIRI Human Rights Data Project, 19902010, Brazil). This shows compliance with many of the human rights treaties that Brazil
has signed. However, it only shows compliance with a particular type of human rights.
Brazil’s Judiciary
Introduction
Brazil has maintained respect for civil and political human rights, while widely
disregarding any obligation to protect physical integrity rights. Perhaps analyzing how
the judiciary in Brazil functions will give us further insight into these discrepancies in
human rights practices. Brazil’s constitution provides for an independent judiciary, and in
general, the practices of the judiciary do meet the description of an independent judiciary.
For example, justices of the Federal Supreme Court are nominated by the President and
then voted on by other branches of the government and then approved by the senate.
Justices are appointed for an indefinite term until the justice retires, is forced to retired at
age 70 (by constitutional provision) or is impeached (Supremo Tribunal Federal, 2011).
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The federal courts tend to be more independent in practice than state and municipal
courts.
While the Federal Supreme Court is funded adequately and functions properly,
some local courts remain under-funded and inefficient. According to the 2009 United
States Department of State country report, some rural courts had difficulties maintaining
an effective judiciary and were influenced by outside politics (Human Rights Report,
2010, Brazil). However, for the scope of this paper I will not be looking at the
independence of each individual court in Brazil for numerous reasons. Rather, I will be
examining the independence of the Federal Supreme Court and the independence of the
specialized military courts. Local courts that are not completely independent exist in
every country, and not necessarily as a result of state mandate. There is a very stark
difference between a local court that is influenced by local politics and a court system
which has no level of independence due to the structure and design of the court. Brazil’s
courts, in general, are structured to function independently and judicial independence is
provided for in the state constitution. Furthermore, as stated previously in chapter 5, there
is a difference between horizontal accountability provided by the courts and vertical
accountability. While municipal courts give citizens access to the judiciary, they do not
provide horizontal accountability. Municipal courts would provide horizontal
accountability if they held jurisdiction over police officers (which are a local arm of the
federal government), however in Brazil police officers do not fall under the jurisdiction
of the local courts. Therefore, since the local municipal courts of Brazil do not provide
horizontal accountability, I will not be analyzing them. Brazil does have specialized
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military courts which hold jurisdiction over Brazil’s police force. Since the military court
provides horizontal accountability it will be examined later.
Brazil’s General Courts
Brazil’s independent federal judiciary could explain why there are relatively no
violations of civil and political human rights. Brazil has clearly adopted international
norms regarding respect for these rights. How has the independent judiciary helped
maintain compliance with the particular human rights treaties Brazil has ratified
regarding civil and political rights? An independent judiciary has the responsibility to
hold other branches of the government accountable to its constitutional provisions and
treaty commitments. In fact, according to Brazil’s constitution, all courts have the power
to hear cases involving human rights violations (Lima Marques & Lixinski, 2009 p. 19).
Generally, the courts are used in this scope to interpret the meaning of international
human rights treaties as applied to the creation of federal law, to ensure that the legislator
is acting in accordance with the treaty obligations. The judiciary also uses the
international treaties in interpreting federal law in cases involving human rights practices
in Brazil. For example, in 2002 the courts used wording from the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights (UDHR) to determine that “essential utility services, such as the
provision of water, could not be suspend in case of non-payment, precisely because of
their essential character for the realization of human rights and human dignity as
protected by the Declaration” (Lima Marques & Lixinski, 2009, pp. 20-21).
Other cases exist as well which show the use of international human rights treaties
by the courts to protect human rights. The right to life protected by the UDHR was used
to guarantee access to medical treatment by the state. Furthermore,
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Other uses [of the UDHR] include: to reinforce the right of association and the
formation of labor unions; to guarantee the right to housing against eviction; to
guarantee the right of access to justice; to have access to independent and
impartial courts in the determination of a person’s rights and obligations; to
protect the right to privacy in its balance with the right of freedom of expression;
or to guarantee the secrecy of mail communications. (Lima Marques & Lixinski,
p. 21)
This shows specifically how the courts of Brazil have used international human rights
treaties to interpret local laws and to ensure that the rights in the treaties they have
ratified are adequately respected. In doing so, Brazil’s courts have acted independently to
ensure that the rights outlined in ratified treaties are protected, rather than acting in regard
to any conflicting state interest. The actions the courts have taken to interpret state laws
in a way that is cohesive with ratified human rights treaties is reflected by the widespread
respect for civil and political human rights experienced in Brazil.
However, there are still widespread violations of physical integrity rights in Brazil
that need to be addressed. As stated before, these incidents usually occur during police
encounters and in prison. The Brazilian government has completely failed at maintaining
any effective level of police oversight. Rather, the police force runs amuck, committing
numerous human rights violations while receiving little to no punishment. In fact, fatal
police shootings accounted for 10% of all homicides in Sao Paulo and Rio de Janeiro
(Macaulay, p. 4; Winslow, Crime and Society). There is clearly a lack of accountability
for Brazilian police officers. Interestingly, the word “accountability” is cannot be
translated into Spanish or Portuguese, reflecting the weakness of the concept in Brazilian
culture. The lack of accountability of Brazil’s military police could be explained by the
structure of Brazil’s judiciary.
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Brazil’s Military Courts
While Brazil’s judiciary is general designed to be independent, there is one
caveat. The police in Brazil do not answer to the general court system that the remaining
citizens do. Rather, there is a separate court system for the Brazilian police force. This
adds a new variable to the analysis. Instead of just looking at judicial independence, in
this case it is necessary to examine the military court system in which Brazil’s police
officers are tried. Historically, the military court system is much older than the newer,
general court system. The general court system was formed after democratization in
1985. Prior to 1985, Brazil’s authoritarian and militaristic regime utilized the military
court system in all cases, even during peacetime. During this time the courts were used
specifically to prosecute cases of subversion. Because of this, the court was used more to
suppress citizens, especially those who were against the government. The courts
commonly relied on confessions extracted by torture, and also convicted citizens of
activities that were not crimes at the time the act was committed (Pereira, 2000, p. 5).
After Brazil was democratized in 1985, the military court system was not dissolved.
While its jurisdiction was limited in ways due to minor reform efforts, police officers still
fall under its jurisdiction. Furthermore, the courts system maintains the mentality that
they are working for the state, rather than the people. This creates a slew of problems,
considering that the courts are intended to provide protections for individual citizens.
There are many problems with this system that keep it from being considered
independent. First, the manner in which judges in the court are selected and maintained is
far from being considered independent. The judges in the military court system are not
actually judges at all. They have little to no legal training. Rather, active duty personnel
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serve as judges on the courts. Because of this, there is no separation between the courts
and the military, which is an arm of the executive branch of the government. This lies
completely counter to the characteristics of an independent judiciary. Furthermore, the
very nature of a separate court system for a specific group of citizens violates any notion
of equality before the law, something an independent judiciary should strive to protect
(Pereira, 2000, p. 2). The military courts are not created or intended to protect the rights
of the citizens. Rather, this institution has been maintained from Brazil’s militaristic
history to protect the interests of the state. In this way, the democratization of Brazil has
failed to produce completely democratic results. While Brazil is democratic and was able
to construct an independent judiciary, this one institution of the state has failed to
progress. This may not keep Brazil from being considered democratic, but it does create a
threat to democracy, and to the protection of citizens’ rights.
The military court system is not only independent in structure, but also in
practice. According to the 2009 United States Department of State country report, the law
mandates that the military court system has jurisdiction over cases involving police
officers, except in cases where an officer is charged with willful homicide (Human Rights
Report, 2010, Brazil). Cases of homicide are investigated by fellow police officers to
determine whether the act was willful. Often this is done by comrades in police force,
resulting in very few cases actually being reported to the civilian court system (Human
Rights Report, 2010, Brazil; Macaulay, p. 9; Winslow, Crime and Society). Very little
accountability is exercised in the specialized military court. Even though the majority of
police cases are heard in the military court, very few of the cases actually result in
convictions or punishment. Furthermore, many of the charges against police are either
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dismissed or reduced, with the reasoning that the police tactics were justified and
necessary. For example, many torture charges are dropped stating that the actions are an
appropriate response to the situation or are standard police practice. Other torture charges
that are not dropped are reduced to ‘abuse of authority’ or ‘bodily harm’ which carries a
much lesser sentence and a shorter statute of limitations (Macaulay, p. 12; Winslow,
Crime and Society).Because of these changes in charges, police either serve lesser
sentences or the charges are eventually dropped after the courts delay trials as to
intentionally exceed the statute of limitations. In 2001 of the 224 complaints filed
regarding the military police, only two reached the prosecutor’s office (Macaulay, p. 13;
Winslow, Crime and Society). This means that an overwhelming amount of complaints
against the military police never resulted in charges against the police.
The military courts in Brazil are clearly on the side of the police, not the people.
This is shown through the number of complaints against the police that never result in
charges, the delaying of cases to exceed the statute of limitations and the reduction in
charges to allow police to serve less time than what is appropriate for the crimes
committed. The military court system is in no way holding the police, an arm of the
government, accountable to their commitments to protect the human rights of the citizens
of Brazil. Rather, the structure of the judiciary encourages impunity in the area of human
rights protections. The military courts are not independent. Instead of respecting the law
as a superior power (Chaterjee, 1973, p. 65), it is subject to political influences, and
ignores the law to further empower the police in their corruption. In this case, the lack of
independence in the judiciary appears to be directly related to the widespread human
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rights abuses experienced by the citizens of Brazil in the context of torture and
extrajudicial killings.
Findings and Application
Brazil’s judiciary system is unique from many modern democracies. While the
federal court system appears to function well and remain independent from political
influences, the military court system fails to do both. The federal court system has been
successful in using international human rights treaties in making decisions and
interpreting laws, leading to widespread respect of many rights civil and political rights,
such as freedoms to association, speech, foreign and domestic movement, practice of
religion, and the right to participate in elections. The federal and civil courts, however, do
not have jurisdiction over police affairs, which is where Brazil’s human rights violations
seem to be concentrated. The military court system has failed to remain independent, but
rather serves to protect the police forces in Brazil from charges and sentences.
The case of Brazil provides a lot of support for the argument that independent
judiciaries help keep states accountable to their obligations to the human rights treaties
they have ratified. The juxtaposition of the federal courts and the military courts in Brazil
show just how effective an independent judiciary can be in protecting human rights, and
also how ineffective a judiciary can be in protecting human rights. The importance of the
judiciary cannot be overstated. Many states have military courts, in which military
personnel are tried specifically for military crimes such as insubordination. Brazil’s
military courts far overstep this power and instead try military officers for non-military
crimes, and federal police officers as well (Kyle & Reiter, 2011, p. 1)
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Further research needs to look at other Latin American states that also have a
military court system along with their general courts. There are 10 other states in Latin
American that have some form of military court system: Bolivia, Chile, Colombia,
Mexico, Cuba, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Argentina and Venezuela. Research should
focus on how these military court systems are utilized in the state. Specifically, it should
be considered whether these courts are used to try non-military crimes, and whether the
federal police fall under their jurisdiction. This would help determine whether military
courts commonly encourage impunity with human rights violations. Furthermore,
Ecuador recently unified its court system, and this year passed legislation that integrated
the members of the former military court system with those of the general justice system.
The new unified system tries all cases, including those dealing with military officers
(Human Rights Report, 2010, Ecuador). Research looking at states with separate military
court systems should be compared to Ecuador’s judiciary. Ideally, Ecuador will see
improvements in their human rights practice as a result of this recent transition.
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion
“Recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the
world” (United Nations, 1948). The United Nations established a legal concept of human
rights in 1948 with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This document stated
that all members of the human race are entitled to specific rights, based merely on the
qualification of being human. Since then, the United Nations have also drafted various
human rights treaties that specify further various human rights. As discussed earlier,
human rights are universal, meaning every human being is entitled to them, and every
state has a duty to protect them. However, states continue to violate human rights,
making them noncompliant with the human rights treaties they have ratified.
While many studies have attempted to explain the reasoning behind state
noncompliance with human rights treaties, a vast majority of these studies are too broad.
While studies examining the relationship between democracy and human rights treaty
compliance produce very mixed results, studying the relationship between judicial
independence and human rights treaty compliance narrows the focus enough to determine
concisely the root of specific human rights issues in various states. Judicial independence
is a critical component to democracy, and to the protection of human rights.
As seen with the case study on Brazil, the lack of judicial independence,
specifically in the military courts, leads to widespread human rights abuses in a specific
area of human rights: physical integrity rights. There is a very discernable relationship
between the two variables in this case. Other states in Latin American also have
established military courts as well. Further research needs to examine how these courts
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are used and whether they are independent or whether, similarly to Brazil, they work for
the state and against the people. The military courts in these states also need to be
compared to the general courts in each state, evaluating whether the general court is
independent or not as well. My research has policy implications in this area. Foreign
policy should focus on improving human rights practices through improving the
independence of the judiciary.
My research contributes to the existing literature on human rights treaty
compliance, as well as the literature on judicial independence. Examining the relationship
between specific state institutions and human rights treaty compliance has only recently
become popular, and little research exists on the specific institution of the judiciary.
While Powell and Staton did examine these variables, they focused more broadly on
judicial effectiveness. However, looking more specifically at judicial independence gives
insight into the specific structures of the judiciary which cause judicial effectiveness or a
lack thereof. This distinction is especially important in the case of Brazil, where judicial
independence explains the lack of effectiveness in the military courts.
My research also suggests that democratic transitions remain imperfect. Despite
efforts to democratize various states, some institutions fail to transition. For example, the
judiciary in Brazil is a vestige of the previous autocratic regime. Knowing this can allow
efforts to focus more diligently on democratic transitions, and specifically how to make
transitions more effective. Doing so would allow democratization efforts to better meet
their goals. This would also result in more viable democratic institutions, as well as an
increase in human rights protections.
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Determining whether judicial independence affects state compliance with human
rights treaties is critical in the study of human rights. If a significant relationship can be
established between the two variables, then efforts can be focused on the judiciary to help
improve human rights practices. Ideally, this would result in an improvement in human
rights practices, allowing more members of the human race to access to the rights they
are promised.
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